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1.
Leo Strauss formulates his conviction in this respect very firmly: “With-
out towns, there are no philosophers. Towns are indispensible conditions 
for philosophizing.”1 If we decide to acknowledge this claim, then several 
consequences will follow. First, philosophy is not a domain of a  totally 
“free,” “pure” thinking; it has its conditions upon which it hinges and 
which can certainly have their impact upon philosophy’s course. Second, 
although we tend to assume that philosophy is a domain of the individual 
and as such it belongs to the domain of the private, polis as a condition 
of thinking evidently translates it into the very heart of the public sphere. 
Philosophy cannot therefore look for a  shelter in the isolated realm of 
the subject, it is inter-subjective, and therefore opened to various inspi-
rations but also dangers coming from the outside. Third, if philosophy 
constitutes a most sublime effort of the human individual, then this very 
individual turns out to be limited and circumscribed in his or her indi-
viduality. Plato’s Socrates puts it succinctly in his intuition as to the origin 
of the polis: “[...] a city is due, as I imagine, to this fact, that we are not 
individually independent, but have many wants” (53).2 The city is then 
nothing else but an organized congregation of, as Plato puts it, “many as-
sociates and helpers into one dwelling-place,” which accentuates the fact 
that the formation of polis is energized first of all by the notions of assis-
tance and help. Those who are in need of much must recognize the pro-
found fact that they are not self-sufficient and therefore, in consequence, 
1 Jakub Klein and Leo Strauss, „Wyjaśnienia” [Explanations], trans. Paulina Sosnowska. Kronos 
nr 2 (2012), 131.
2 Plato, The Republic, trans. John Davies and David Vaughan (London: Macmillan, 1950), 53.
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must take upon themselves the necessity of a certain indebtedness. The 
city is a  complicated structure of debt and credit, material, moral, and 
also economic.
2.
The question of (in)sufficiency is central. Not only does it indicate the 
psychologically-grounded origin of the city but also it accounts for it 
open-endedness. The city begins, but then it does not seem to know where 
to end. In the dialogue Socrates keeps on enumerating professional skills, 
inevitable for the survival of polis, to conclude that the insufficiency of the 
human individual which stands at the origin of the city finds its continu-
ation in the insufficiency of the city itself which has to grow in order to 
satiate (an impossible task) its wants:
Then we shall also have to enlarge our city, for our first and healthy city 
will not now be of sufficient size, but requires to be increased in bulk, 
and filled out with multitude of callings, which do not exist in cities to 
satisfy any natural want [...].3
The city, which as we have learned is indispensible for the practice of 
philosophy, develops along the trajectory which takes it away from the 
“healthy” situation in which the wants of men were still “natural” and 
evolves towards an ever greater divorce between “nature” and “wants.” 
Thus, polis is a result (never completed, as the wants, once made independ-
ent of their “natural” origin, have been set upon the spiral of inventive-
ness which knows no limit) of the growing separation not only between 
man and “nature” where “nature” stands for the physical environment 
of human life; first of all, the history of the city records a monumental 
betrayal – it poignantly demonstrates that man betrays himself or herself 
through the process of generation of wants which are not “natural.” Man 
not only conquers and thus betrays nature as the external environment 
but also deceives and colonizes himself or herself, circumvents his or her 
own “nature.”
3 Plato, The Republic, 59.
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3.
Closer to our times Henry David Thoreau makes exactly the same obser-
vation. For the Concord sage the existential experiment conducted on the 
shores of Walden was to philosophically re-enact the experience of the 
frontier:
The incessant anxiety and strain of some is a well nigh incurable dis-
ease. We are made to exaggerate the importance of what work we do. 
[…] It would be some advantage to live a  primitive and frontier life, 
though in the midst of an outward civilization, if only to learn what 
are the gross neccessaries of life and what methods have been taken to 
obtain them [...].4
Frontier is now translated from the domain of civilizational progress and 
ruthless conquest of space into the sphere of man’s existence where it is to 
perform a diametrically different function. If the historical frontier aimed 
at expansion and appropriation, its existential declension wants to achieve 
reduction and expropriation in order to disclose a deceptive role of what 
Thoreau calls “luxuries” (Plato’s “unnatural wants”) not as indispensible, 
but as “positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind.”5 The expropria-
tion in question not only refers to a criticism of the centrality of the no-
tion of ownership, but, principally and more importantly, tries to name 
a specific approach of a subject to himself or herself. The distancing which 
characterizes this process is a necessary move beyond oneself, over the so-
cially designated, and economically and administratively traced, borders, 
so that we could gain a position from which both individual subject and 
the structure of the society could be evaluated and then, hopefully, modi-
fied. Thoreau withdraws to his Walden hut not to simply avoid the com-
munity but to go beyond it, not to forget it but to remember it in a special 
way. What is at stake is a necessity of re-thinking the community and 
then, somewhat in a manner of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, of coming back 
to it in order to renew it. This is what Thoreau postulates under the name 
4 Henry David Thoreau, Walden, ed. Owen Thomas (New York: Norton, 1966), 7.
5 Thoreau, Walden, 90–1.
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of “solitude.” It is not to be understood in terms of spatial designations 
(“Solitude is not measured by the miles of space that intervene between 
a man and his fellows”), but by its critical potential embedded in the very 
act of “going beyond” the limits of the social. In fine, solitude is a mode of 
thinking which destabilizes and unhinges the structures which have been 
determining the construction of both social and individual life:
With thinking we may be beside ourselves in a  sane sense. By a con-
scious effort of the mind we can stand aloof from actions and their 
consequences; and all things, good and bad, go by us like a torrent. […] 
I only know myself as a human entity; the scene, so to speak, of thoughts 
and affections; and am sensible of a certain doubleness by which I can 
stand as remote from myself as from another.6
4.
We should not underplay the seemingly off-hand proviso which indicates 
that a position of solitude is very likely to be dismissed, stigmatized, if 
not openly penalized, by being sent to the domain of illness. Those who 
position themselves at a critical distance from the established institutions 
and the ways in which they regulate social and individual lives risk be-
ing referred to as mentally unstable and as those who, by going beside 
themselves, have lost their “sane sense.” If we remember that the adjective 
“melancholic” was considered to be a synonym of madness, dispiritedness, 
taedium vitae, or Angst for a long period of time, and Robert Burton’s 1621 
famous Anatomy of Melancholy allows us to consider melancholy not only 
as a  form of madness but, more importantly, an irrevocable element of 
human condition (in one of the key fragments of the introduction to his 
work Democritus, Burton’s porte-parole, says plainly “[...] thou shalt soon 
perceive that all the world is mad, that it is melancholy, dotes”),7 then we 
cannot forego the fact that the first words which introduce Jacques in 
act 2, scene 1 of Shakespeare’s As You Like It take us right into the very 
heart of melancholia’s darkness. Commenting upon Duke Senior’s hesita-
6 Thoreau, Walden, 9.
7 Richard Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, vol. 1 (London: Dent & Sons, 1948), 39.
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tions about hunting and killing animals, one of the Lords says: “Indeed, 
my Lord, / The melancholy Jacques grieves at that.”8 Sadness and death 
contribute to the attitude which bears the name of melancholy. It is sad-
ness, grief over death, to be more specific, grieving over death – along two 
paths. One evidently brings us back to the question of human finitude – 
it is grieving over death which marks / mars every human life, a grief of 
and over mortality. The other capitalizes on this anxiety; it is grieving 
over a death which somehow is not “natural,” which does not come at its 
due time but which is “artificially” imposed upon a living being, an un-
timely death, a death which has nothing to do with time. Succinctly, we 
could subsume the former type under the term of dying, whereas the latter 
would belong to the regime of killing. Duke senior wants to go hunting, 
that is, as he himself puts it, “go and kill us some venison.”
5.
At this moment we enter the realm of politics. For Thomas Hobbes, fear, 
which stands at the root of human social organization, has to bring us 
to melancholy and must leave us in this domain since there is no way in 
which we make ourselves exempt from melancholy as the overwhelming 
existential and social mood. A fear of one human individual being afraid 
of his or her neighbour finds its extension in the fear which motivates the 
state to undertake violent actions against its own citizens. As Roberto 
Esposito declares, “it is in the presupposition of a  generalized capacity 
for killing as the originary form of the human relationship that marks 
the structurally melancholy character of Hobbes’s political theory.”9 That 
Jacques is introduced while commenting on the scene of the kill is not in-
cidental: not only does it present a critique of the human attitude towards 
nature, but, more importantly, it indicates that this attitude of absolute 
appropriation (which includes the right to deprive a being of its life) results 
from a general theory of the political-social organization of human life. 
The unfounded proclamation of man’s dominion over nature is an effect 
8 William Shakespeare, The Complete Works (New York: Gramercy Book, 1975), 229–55. All 
the other quotations will come from this edition.
9 Roberto Esposito, Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics, trans. Rhiannon 
Welch (New York, Fordham University Press, 2013), 30.
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of the proclamation of man’s dominion over being in general. Jacques’s 
criticism of Duke Senior carefully combines these two realms: brutality 
over nature is a result of the brutality over another human being which, 
in turn, is an effect of man’s claim to a ruthless control of being. As one 
of the Lords reports:
Indeed, my lord,
The melancholy Jacques grieves at that;
And, in that kind, swears you do more usurp
Than doth your brother that hath banish’d you. (2.1)
6.
Usurpation is a frequent theme in Shakespeare’s plays. It deals with a loss 
of power taken over by one who betrays the idealized law of politics (poli-
tics aims at what is good for the widest public), first, by disrespecting the 
law which secures the legitimacy of power, and, second, by employing all 
kinds of tactical moves to legitimise the rule which, by definition, cannot 
be legitimized. The one who is a usurper tries to ignore not only his or her 
unlawful action but also, as Macbeth’s case demonstrates it, this person 
also disregards signs with which reality incessantly reminds him or her 
of the truth of usurpation. As Duke Senior was ousted from power by 
his deceitful brother, in the same way now, in his Arden Forest exile, he 
perpetuates the same kind of action through chasing away and eventually 
eliminating animals who, as he himself confides, are “native burghers of 
this desert city.” This is the second reason why it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to leave the enchanted circle of melancholy. If the first reason held that 
melancholy is an innate condition of human life, the second maintains 
that since man is a being which deprives other beings of what is theirs, 
and then those who have been deprived of their legitimate dominion ex-
ecute the same kind of usurping activity against those who still hold on 
to their realm, if we deal with a long, unending sequence of usurpations, 
then melancholy, which carries a dark loss in its centre, must also be the 
element of the political and social. The first kind of loss is detectable in 
every individual human being. As Burton puts it: “No man amongst us 
[is – T.S.] so sound, of so good a constitution, that hath not some impedi-
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ment of body or mind.”10 The second kind of loss deserves the name of 
deprivation, as it de-privatizes decrement in question and puts it forth as 
a rule which has to be taken into account in the organization of human 
politics. In this respect Burton precedes Hobbes:
The greatest enemy to man is man, who by the devil’s instigation is still 
ready to do mischief, his own executioner, a wolf, a devil to himself and 
others.11
7.
The loss which is the dark source of the organization of human individual 
and social life is nothing else, to put it simply, but a certain mis-use of the 
world. It is not so much the very notion of usability, usefulness, practi-
cal application, which Jacques comments upon looking at the murderous 
activities of the hunting lords; at the centre of his reflection is the fact that 
the proper use, the legitimate use, the use which would serve life, has been 
replaced by a mis-rule, a mis-application, a mis-use in the service of a dou-
ble death. A death of (political, economic) adversaries, of those who try to 
keep their own domain, the “burghers” of their “native” realm; but also 
a death of the public good which in the act of usurpation is being brutally 
translated into the language of a private gain. Duke’s “shall we go and 
kill us some venison” is a clear indication of this move. The animal which 
exists publically in its native domain becomes, through the act of killing, 
mere flesh, no longer a “stag” but “venison.” The culinary has usurped and 
extended its dominion over the living. The etymology of usurp reminds 
us of this shift; clearly related to the Latin usus, it swerved towards a kind 
of use which has been broken, betrayed, mis-sed (without ceasing to be 
a kind of devilish, dark, use), usum rumpere or usurapere, that is to seize 
for one’s own use. We are just one step short of economics, where usury 
signifies a mis-use of money to generate profit for a private party, private 
enjoyment. In his report on Jacques’s behaviour the Lord twists all these 
threads into one argument:
10 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, vol. 1, 137.
11 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, vol. 1, 134.
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Thus most invectively he pierceth through
The body of the country, city, court,
Yea, and of this our life: swearing that we
Are mere usurpers, tyrants, and what’s worse,
To fright the animals, and to kill them up
In their assign’d and native dwelling-place. (2.1)
8.
Nothing escapes the critique of the melancholic mind which clearly rec-
ognizes the over-all pattern of history: the displaced ones will seize the 
nearest occasion to keep on with the work of usurpation. “This our life” 
refers to a  supposed counter model of community of people who have 
been mis-used by others but who cannot, despite their declarations with 
which Shakespeare’s comedy opens, stop from claiming spaces not theirs. 
The melancholic politics of Jacques recognizes this mechanism of dis-
placement, mis-use, and de-assignation, of the denial of “native dwelling-
places” and draws two conclusions: that criticism of such an organization 
of political and social life is possible only from its inside, and that to be 
able to undertake such a critique one must place oneself on the periph-
ery of community. Thus, there is a “negative” and a “positive” aspect of 
melancholy. The former deals with the numerous tactics of usurpation 
and politics of expelling beings from their native places; the latter allows 
us, precisely because of the constant shift of places, to see the drawbacks 
and limitations of the mechanism of mis-use. Duke Senior inadvertently 
touches upon this visionary aspect of the politics of melancholy when he 
speaks of Jacques as of one who in his solitary placement on the periphery 
of the community is able to disclose what is important, what matters for 
the very community, and what the community cannot itself see. Depart-
ing for the forest where he hopes to find Jacques, he declares that it is such 
a peripheral being, a being without an easily locatable place, that provides 
the community with an insight it cannot afford:
Show me the place:
I love to cope him in these sullen fits,
For then he’s full of matter. (2.1)
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9.
Duke Senior wants to be directed to “the place,” and the definite article 
is an indication of the importance of such an unmappable position. It 
is only from such a  placing that the community can learn something 
substantial (“full of matter”) about itself. At the periphery of the pe-
riphery, where we have “lost” hopes associated with the loss as a possible 
improvement (and Duke staunchly represents such hopes in the renewal 
of the politics and society), in such an almost impossible position of sad-
ness (“sullen fits”), we can truly reflect upon the community in the way 
which does not reproduce the usual organization of such reflection. Thus, 
Jacques as a melancholic politian, or, rather, as a politian of melancholy, 
wants to deliver a  certain truth about community which will shake its 
foundations by demonstrating that the practice of filling up the empty 
place is wrong, because to deal with a loss we have to acknowledge it as 
such rather than continue the politics of producing more losses which 
are to, paradoxically, fill up the vacant space. This is what Duke Senior 
and his courtiers do when they hunt the animals of the Arden Forest: 
they fill up the empty place and the empty time both of which have 
opened suddenly at the moment of the loss of power. Community is 
thus viewed as a  complicated system in which the constant usurpation 
of empty spaces leading towards the practically illimitable extension of 
the territory (described by Plato as the main mechanism energizing the 
life of polis) must be counteracted by the reductive movement originating 
from the peripheries – that is, from the recognition of and confrontation 
with the limit. In this counteraction the politics of melancholy meets the 
aesthetics of the sublime:
Melancholy is a virtue for Kant because, wresting man from every un-
merited self-valorization, it procures for him the moral consciousness 
that is inseparable from his own freedom. Continuously striking against 
his own insuperable limits, the melancholic man is the only one who 
grasps that the only way to realize a lack is to keep it as such.12
12 Esposito, Terms of the Political, 34.
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10.
The moral consciousness inseparable from one’s freedom reveals itself 
when we are facing the limit, which means that we are expropriated from 
our “native place” not because it has been usurped by somebody else, but 
because we have given up on the idea of the native place to begin with. 
This is what we find in a long exposition of Jacques’s politics of melancholy 
at the beginning of act 4 which is a strong manifestation of a lack or loss 
conceived of as the only possible place which we can try to name our 
“own” in full awareness that, in fact, it does not belong to me. I can call 
“mine” only what I have first identified as somebody else’s and from what 
I  then tried to distil my “own” subjecthood. Before we quote Jacques’s 
manifesto, Rosalind’s response will clearly describe the situation in which 
“I” is nothing else but an empty slot after having determined alien ter-
ritories, “I” is what appears empty-handed and what has quite consciously 
allowed itself to be dispossessed of anything that could be called its “own.” 
To Jacques’s statement of the politics of melancholy which presents the 
empty-handed “I” as a  “traveller” Rosalind replies: “A  traveller! By my 
faith, you have great reason to be sad: I fear you have sold your own land 
to see other men’s; then, to have seen much, and to have nothing, is to 
have rich eyes and poor hands” (4.1).
11.
Sadness of melancholic disposition results from the experience of “noth-
ing” which in terms of economy means “selling” without profit, selling 
below the price, and in the order of senses it moves all the accent from 
the touching of ownership (having) to the nothingness of seeing. Having 
“rich eyes and poor hands” is Shakespeare’s formula for melancholy which 
“is made of nothing and impossible to appropriate because melancholy 
is made up of expropriation itself.”13 It is this force of “nothing” which 
allows for another way of thinking about community, a thinking which 
accentuates its indeterminate character. Since melancholia stems from the 
“nothing,” its thinking resigns from any identifiable, ideologically prede-
termined positions and speaks on behalf of the hermeneutics of what is 
13 Esposito, Terms of the Political, 29.
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identifiable not so much through mere negation and denial, but, rather, 
through the logic of “not quite this and not quite that” which also involves 
a constitution of the subject. Jacques provides us with a long list of exam-
ples of this logic in his speech:
I have neither the scholar’s melancholy, which is emulation; nor the mu-
sician’s, which is fantastical; nor the courtier’s, which is proud; nor the 
soldier’s, which is ambitious; nor the lawyer’s, which is politic; nor the 
lover’s, which is all these: but it is a  melancholy of mine own, com-
pounded of many simples, extracted from many objects: and, indeed, 
the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination 
wraps me in a most humorous sadness. (4.1)
Melancholia as a manner of political thinking defuses the power of estab-
lished social roles, as well as denies the possibility of being inscribed under 
any of the adjectives commonly used to render the activities characteristic 
of these roles. But while claiming its “own” position, it also compromises 
it since what is referred to as “mine” is a mosaic of elements borrowed 
from what is definitely not my “own.” Politics of melancholia can be prac-
ticable only from such an unmappable and indescribable place from which 
we can try to modify the ways of community.
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